We treat the security of group key exchange (GKE) in the universal composability (UC) framework. Analyzing GKE protocols in the UC framework naturally addresses attacks by malicious insiders. We define an ideal functionality for GKE that captures contributiveness in addition to other desired security goals. We show that an efficient two-round protocol securely realizes the proposed functionality in the random oracle model. As a result, we obtain the most efficient UC-secure contributory GKE protocol known.
ensures that the established session key is computationally indistinguishable from a random string, whereas mutual authentication guarantees that each party is assured of the participation of every other party in the protocol.
The above models assume the adversary to be an outsider who is not part of the GKE protocol execution. Katz and Shin [24] define insider security for GKE protocols by separating the requirements of mutual authentication into agreement on the session key and security against insider impersonation attacks. Bohli et al. [5] revisit this notion in the weak corruption model, where session state is not revealed. They also present insider attacks on the protocols of Katz and Yung [25] and Kim et al. [26] that violate integrity of those protocols. Later, Bresson and Manulis [10] unify the insider security notions of Katz and Shin into their definition of mutual authentication.
Another important security notion, considered by Bohli et al. [5] and Bresson and Manulis [10] , is contributiveness in the presence of malicious insiders. A protocol satisfying this notion ensures that a proper subset of insiders cannot predetermine the session key. Note that if the resulting session key is allowed to be controlled by insiders, the session may be fixed to any value including the keys established in the past sessions. Hence, the protocol in this case cannot guarantee even the basic key freshness property. Lack of contributiveness may also allow insiders to establish "covert channels" by fixing the key to a value agreed with an outsider beforehand [29, 19] . For example, if the session key is to be used for the purpose of achieving confidentiality of future communication, this will allow an insider to leak the sensitive information without being detected.
Universal Composability. In the universal composability (UC) framework [12] , a cryptographic task is specified through an ideal functionality. The UC formulation allows cryptographic protocols to preserve their security under arbitrary protocol composition. This also facilitates modular design of complex protocols. However, defining an appropriate ideal functionality for some cryptographic tasks has proven not to be easy [12] .
Canetti and Krawczyk [15] show that their earlier gamebased notion of SK-security [13] for two-party key exchange is equivalent to a relaxed notion of UC-security. This implies that a two-party key exchange protocol that satisfies SK-security preserves its security under arbitrary protocol composition. On the other hand, Katz and Shin [24] define an ideal functionality for the task of GKE in the UC framework and show that this notion of UC-security is strictly stronger than the game-based notions for GKE. There is no known equivalence between the game-based notions and UC notions of security for GKE and it is known that game-based notions guarantee security only when the protocols are run "stand-alone". Hence, we treat the security of GKE in the UC framework.
Katz and Shin also present a compiler (we call this the KS-compiler) that turns an AKE-secure protocol into a protocol that can realize their proposed ideal functionality. The KS-compiler follows the informal suggestion of Canetti and Krawczyk [15] to ensure that the compiled protocol has the so-called "ACK-property" [15, 24] . However, it introduces an extra round of communication for broadcasting a signature authenticated acknowledgment message. As the existing AKE-secure GKE protocols require at least two rounds of communication [25, 20] , a KS-compiled protocol will have at least three communication rounds. In spite of introducing an additional round, the KS-compiler does not provide contributiveness in the presence of malicious insiders [27, Section 9.5] . On the other hand, Bohli et al. [5] present a two-round GKE protocol that satisfies contributiveness in the presence of insiders. This protocol cannot be obtained through the KS-compiler.
Furukawa et al. [21] present an ideal functionality for GKE without considering contributiveness. They also propose a two-round GKE protocol based on bilinear pairings and use non-interactive proofs to guarantee the ACK-property. This protocol is also shown to securely realize their functionality in the standard model. However, to establish a session key among a group of n parties, the protocol requires each party to perform 2n+1 pairing computations apart from other operations. These computations make this protocol very inefficient when compared to existing insider secure protocols [5, 10] , which are proven secure under game-based notions. In this paper, we focus on defining an ideal functionality which guarantees contributiveness and at the same time can be realized by efficient GKE protocols.
Our Approach. Canetti and Krawczyk [15] note that a two-party key exchange protocol not having the ACKproperty does not necessarily have any security weakness. They also introduce a tool called "non-information oracle" to relax a natural two-party key exchange functionality. It is shown that the relaxed functionality can be securely realized by protocols which do not have the ACK-property. We apply this approach to the case of GKE.
Contributions. We first propose a GKE functionality using non-information oracles. Unlike the formulation of Canetti and Krawczyk [15] , our functionality runs multiple copies of the non-information oracle. Canetti and Krawczyk informally remark that this approach is more natural with each copy of the non-information oracle representing single session execution within a single participant. Another important advantage of this approach is that it naturally allows us to model an unreliable broadcast channel, where the parties do not necessarily receive the same values. We show that the proposed UC notion implies existing game-based security notions of AKE-security, mutual authentication and contributiveness.
In the later part of the paper, we modify the protocol of Bohli et al. [5] and show that it securely realizes the proposed functionality in the random oracle model. The modification to the protocol introduces a slight computational overhead for each party but not any communication rounds. Besides assuring strong security, this protocol is the most efficient GKE protocol proven secure in the UC framework.
Organization. We give an overview of the UC framework and the ideal functionality of Katz and Shin in Section 2. Section 3 presents an ideal functionality for GKE with contributiveness. A protocol that securely realizes the proposed functionality is given in Section 4 with a proof of security. Appendix A reviews existing game-based notions of security and also presents a revised notion of contributiveness. In Appendix B, we show that the security guaranteed by our functionality implies existing game-based security notions for GKE.
UNIVERSALLY COMPOSABLE GROUP KEY EXCHANGE
We first give a brief overview of the UC framework, assuming basic familiarity. Please refer to Canetti [12] for more details. We also discuss the assumptions we make. A brief overview of Katz and Shin's ideal functionality for GKE is then provided.
In the UC framework, the security requirements of a task at hand are captured by an ideal functionality F, which runs instructions specified by a trusted party. In an ideal protocol φ for a given F, the ideal (dummy) parties send their input and obtain output from F, which computes the output as per the instructions. An ideal adversary S (also called "simulator") interacts with F and can participate in the ideal protocol φ through corrupted parties. The security of φ is inherently guaranteed as S at the maximum can learn or possibly modify only the internal state of a corrupted party. The real-world execution of a protocol π involves parties running π among themselves and a real-world adversary A, who is allowed to control some of the parties and the communication among all the parties.
A protocol π is said to securely realize F if running π amounts to "emulating" φ. The notion of emulation is defined by introducing an additional entity called environment Z. Z generates inputs to all parties, observes their outputs and is allowed to interact with the adversary in an arbitrary way throughout the course of the computation. The protocol π emulates φ if for any adversary A there exists an adversary S such that, the probability of a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) environment Z, running on the security parameter k and any input, distinguishing its interaction with π and A from an interaction with φ and S is negligible 1 in k. Note that S has to interact with Z just as A does, particularly, S cannot "rewind" Z.
Let ρ be a protocol that securely realizes an ideal functionality F and let π be a protocol executing in the F-hybrid model where the parties in π make ideal calls to multiple instances of F in addition to interacting in the usual way. Let π ρ be a protocol which starts with the protocol π and replaces the interaction with each instance of F with an interaction with a separate instance of ρ. The universal composition theorem of Canetti [12] states that running the composed protocol π ρ has essentially the same effect as running the protocol π in the F-hybrid model. Particularly, if π securely realizes some ideal functionality G in the F-hybrid model then π ρ securely realizes G. The security of cryptographic protocols analyzed in the Functionality FGKE FGKE proceeds as follows, running on security parameter k, with parties U1, . . . , Un, and an ideal adversary S. Initialization: Upon receiving a value (new-session, sid, pid) from party Ui for the first time (where pid is a non-empty set of distinct user identities), record (sid, pid, Ui) and send this to S. In addition, if there are already |pid|-1 recorded tuples (sid, pid, Uj) for Uj ∈ pid\Ui then store (sid, pid, ready) and send this to S.
Key Generation: Upon receiving a message (sid, pid, ok) from S for a recorded tuple (sid, pid, ready), do:
• If all U ∈ pid are uncorrupted, choose κ R ← {0, 1} k and store (sid, pid, κ).
• If any of U ∈ pid is corrupted, wait for S to send a message (key, κ) and then store (sid, pid, κ).
Key Delivery: If S sends a message (deliver, Ui, sid, pid) for a recorded tuple (sid, pid, κ) and Ui ∈pid, then send (sid, pid, κ) to party Ui.
Party Corruption: If S corrupts Ui ∈ pid for a recorded tuple (sid, pid, κ) and message (sid, pid, κ)
has not yet been sent to Ui, then S is given κ. Otherwise, S is given nothing.
Figure 1: Functionality FGKE
UC framework is preserved under arbitrary protocol composition. Furthermore, the UC formulation allows these protocols to be designed and analyzed in a modular way. It should be noted that the preserved security is as guaranteed by the corresponding ideal functionality. Multiple Sessions. In the UC framework, it is sufficient to analyze the security of a single instance of a protocol i.e. it suffices to show that a single instance of a protocol ρ securely realizes some ideal functionality F. The UC theorem can be used to show that multiple concurrent instances of ρ securely realize multiple concurrent instances of F. However, this analysis is valid only if the instances of ρ have mutually disjoint state. The security of a multi-session extension of a protocol ρ whose instances share some joint state can be deduced by applying the universal composition with joint state theorem [17] . Hence, we analyze the security of only a single instance of a GKE protocol.
Party IDs and Session IDs. Similar to all existing work (both in non-UC and UC models) on GKE, we assume the pre-specified peer model [14] , where each party is assumed to know the identities of the intended peers to the session when it commences the protocol. The partner ID (pid) of an instance at a party U is a set of identities of intended peers, including U itself. We assume that unique session IDs are provided by a higher level protocol when the GKE protocol is first initiated, which is in line with the UC formulation. However, as shown by Furukawa et al [21] one can combine the protocol initialization functionality of Barak et al. [2] with a GKE functionality. The combined functionality can be realized by a protocol in which the session ID is derived during the protocol execution.
Corruption Model. We assume that once a party is corrupted the adversary is given the entire current internal state and the adversary takes control of the party from then onwards. This corruption behavior of parties naturally models the so-called strong corruption model [24] . This corruption behavior does not model opening attacks [10] , where only the ephemeral state of a session is revealed. However, we provide an alternate way of modeling opening attacks.
Katz-Shin's functionality for GKE. Figure 1 outlines the ideal functionality FGKE of Katz and Shin [24] , which now we briefly explain FGKE . In the Initialization phase the functionality waits to be notified by each party in pid. Once it receives notification from all of the parties in pid with matching sid and pid, FGKE enters a "ready" state and sends the adversary S a ready message. The Key Generation phase starts only after the functionality receives an ok message from S. Intuitively, this ensures mutual authentication in the sense that each party in pid gets the common key only after it has notified that it wishes to exchange a key with the other parties in pid. FGKE chooses a random key if all the parties in pid are uncorrupted. However, S is allowed to choose the common group key if at least one of the parties in pid is corrupted. The schedule of key delivery to individual parties is determined by S, particularly the key is delivered to a party immediately after S requests FGKE to do so. Finally, to model forward secrecy, the adversary is not given the session key on corruption of a party if the key has already been delivered to that party.
UNIVERSALLY COMPOSABLE GKE WITH CONTRIBUTIVENESS
The functionality FGKE allows the adversary to freely choose the common group key if at least one party in pid is corrupted. Clearly, this modeling lets an insider have complete control over the resulting key. Hence, FGKE guarantees insider security only with respect to impersonation and agreement but not with respect to contributiveness. Informally, a GKE protocol guarantees contributiveness in the presence of malicious participants if no proper subset of participating parties can influence the resulting common key to their advantage. Note that it is possible for an insider to mount denial of service attack by not following the protocol, but we do not deal with such attacks.
A GKE functionality that guarantees contributiveness
FGKE can be easily modified to arrive at a GKE functionality which assures of a random session key as long as there exist a single honest party. However such a functionality cannot be realized by any protocol in the strong corruption model where the entire internal state of a party is revealed upon corruption. To see why, a GKE protocol guaranteeing such strong contributiveness can be seen as a special type of asynchronous distributed coin-tossing protocol. Cleve [18] derive an upper bound of (n − 1)/2 corrupted parties for a coin-tossing protocol among n parties to obtain an unbiased Functionality F + GKE F + GKE proceeds as follows, running on security parameter k, with parties U1, . . . , Un, and an ideal adversary S. F + GKE is parameterized by non-information oracle N . Initialization: Upon receiving a value (sid, pid, new-session) from party Ui ∈ pid for the first time (where pid is a set of at least two distinct party identities), record (sid, pid, Ui) and send this to S. In addition do the following:
1. Invoke a copy Ni of N with fresh random input.
2. If there are already |pid|-1 recorded tuples (sid, pid, Uj) for Uj ∈ pid then store (sid, pid, ready) and send this to S.
Whenever Ni generates a message send this to S and whenever S sends a message to Ni forward this to Ni.
Key Generation: Upon receiving a message (sid, pid, ok) from S for a recorded tuple (sid, pid, ready) do:
• If all the parties Ui ∈ pid are uncorrupted: After all the corresponding copies Ni have generated local output, verify if these outputs are the same. Then choose κ R ← {0, 1} k and store (sid, pid, κ).
• If there exist at least one uncorrupted party Ui ∈ pid: After all the corresponding copies Ni have generated their local output, verify if these outputs are the same. Then set κ to be one of these local outputs and store (sid, pid, κ).
Key Delivery: If S sends a message (deliver, Ui) when there is a recorded tuple (sid, pid, κ) and for Ui ∈ pid then send (sid, pid, κ) to Ui immediately.
Party Corruption: If S corrupts Ui ∈ pid for a recorded tuple (sid,pid,k) and message (sid,pid,k)
has not yet been sent to Ui, then S is given the internal states of all the copies of N (including their local outputs if generated). Otherwise, S is given nothing. output. Hence, as argued by Desmedt et al. [19] , if there is no honest majority of the parties in a GKE protocol the resulting session key can be biased by non-negligible amount. Thus the straightforward modification of FGKE assuming up to (n − 1) corrupted parties cannot be realized. We now present an ideal functionality F + GKE for GKE protocols using "non-information oracle" [15] . Informally, a noninformation oracle has the property that its local output remains indistinguishable from a random string for any PPT adversary that it interacts with. A formal definition is given below:
Definition 1 (Non-information Oracle [15] ). Let N be a PPT interactive Turing machine (ITM). Then N is a non-information oracle if no PPT ITM M, having interacted with N on security parameter k, can distinguish with non-negligible probability between the local output of N and a value drawn uniformly from {0, 1} k .
The functionality F + GKE is presented in Figure 2 . F + GKE invokes a new copy Ni of a non-information oracle N for each unique notification from the parties in pid and allows each copy to interact with the ideal adversary S. Each N i represents a single session execution of the group key exchange in an individual participating party. This is in contrast to the formulation used by Canetti and Krawczyk [15] for twoparty key exchange, where a single non-information oracle captures both the sessions run by the partners of a session. Although complex, the current formulation naturally allows us to model an unreliable broadcast channel in the case of GKE as S is allowed to interact with each copy of N separately.
We now informally argue that the functionality F + GKE intuitively captures contributiveness. The major difference between the functionalities FGKE and F + GKE is in the key generation phase. Note that FGKE allows S to choose the common group key κ when at least one party is corrupted. This allows even a single malicious insider to fix the resulting group key to a value of its choice. On the other hand F + GKE sets the common key to be the output of the copies Ni that correspond to the uncorrupted parties, after verifying that these outputs are the same, when there is at least one uncorrupted party. As discussed earlier, in the presence of at least (|pid| − 1)/2 corrupted parties the output distribution of Ni may be biased. But the output cannot be predetermined. When S corrupts at least one of the parties, F + GKE gives the internal states of all the copies of N . Hence none of the copies of N is a non-information oracle any longer. This reflects the fact that the common group key output by honest parties cannot be kept confidential from insiders. F + GKE chooses the common key uniformly at random from {0, 1} k , when there is no corrupted party. We assume arbitrarily malicious behavior for all the corrupted parties to model insider security. When considering such a behavior, the environment Z is not given read access to the corrupted parties' output tape [16] . Hence, the outputs of the parties are not relevant when all the parties in pid are corrupted.
Relation between relaxed UC-security and previous notions
We show that the security guaranteed by F + GKE implies the existing notions of security reviewed in Appendix A. The claims and the corresponding proofs are in Appendix B.
Bresson and Manulis [10] define a session as opened if the adversary reveals ephemeral secrets of a session without revealing the long-term secret key. They observe that the simulation-based security models like universal composabil- 
Round 2:
Computation Each Ui does the following: ity do not handle opening attacks. The standard corruption model considered in the UC framework is the Byzantine corruption, where the adversary upon corrupting a party learns the entire internal state of that party and controls it from then onwards. To model opening attacks, one may consider honest-but-curious behavior for parties upon corruption, in addition to the Byzantine corruption behavior. Such a formulation requires modifications to F + GKE as the environment should now be allowed to access the output tapes of parties who have been issued only an honest-but-curious corrupt query.
Although we do not explicitly consider opening attacks, note that the functionality F + GKE does allows S to obtain internal states of all the copies of N when at least one party in pid is corrupted. Hence, a protocol that securely realizes F + GKE guarantees mutual authentication and contributiveness in the presence of at most (|pid| − 2) and (|pid| − 1) insiders respectively, while the internal states of all the parties are revealed!
A PROTOCOL THAT REALIZES F + GKE
In Figure 3 , we present a protocol that securely realizes F + GKE . The protocol is a slightly modified version of Bohli et al.'s protocol [5] , which itself is inspired from earlier protocols [26, 11] .
Let {U1, . . . , Un} be the set of parties who wish to establish a common group key. We assume that the parties are ordered in a logical ring with Ui−1 and Ui+1 being the left and right neighbors of Ui for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, U0 = Un and Un+1 = U1. We also assume the pre-specified peer model.
During the initialization phase, a cyclic group G of prime order q, an arbitrary generator g of G and the description of a hash function H that maps to {0, 1} k are chosen. We assume that each party has a pair of long-term private and public key pair for a public key signature scheme. Figure 3 outlines the execution of the protocol after the initialization phase. Unlike the protocol of Bohli et al. [5] , the protocol in Figure 3 avoids rushing attack by broadcasting the commitment to their contribution H(ki) for all the parties, in Round 1. This modification is suggested by Bohli et.al themselves based on the technique of Mitchell et al. [28] . Note that this does not introduce any extra rounds. But the computational cost and message size are slightly increased as each party has to compute and broadcast H(ki) in the first round.
Security Analysis
In order to prove that the protocol in Figure 3 realizes F + GKE we first have to show that there exists a non-information oracle for the exchanged keys. We now present a construction of a non-information oracle N gke , which will be used in the security proof of the protocol.
Let M be the ITM that is interacting with N gke . When activated, N gke expects a message that contains the description of a group G of prime order q and generator g, the description of a hash function H and pid. An i-th copy of N gke proceeds as outlined in Figure 4 . Claim 1. Let SuccNIOM be the success probability of M in distinguishing the output of N gke from random. Then
where qro is the polynomial bound for the number of queries to the random oracle H, |pid| is the number of copies of N gke and SuccCDH is the success probability of solving the CDH problem in the group G.
Proof. (Sketch) We prove the claim in a sequence of games. Let Si be the event that M distinguishes the output of N gke from random in Gamei. Game 1: This is the same as the previous game except that the game aborts if an event Collision occurs, where Collision is the event that a collision occurs in the random oracle. We have
Note that N gke makes |pid| + 3 queries to H in its execution. Hence, the number of calls to the random oracle is bounded by qro + |pid| + 3 and the probability that Collision occurs is
Game 2: This is the same as the previous game except that the game aborts if an event Ask occurs, where Ask is an event that M queries a pair-wise CDH component (y
Note that there exist exactly |pid| unique pair-wise CDH instances that can be formed from the messages sent and received by N gke . If the event Ask happens, we can use M to solve the CDH problem by randomly picking one of the entries of the H asked by M. The success probability of solving CDH SuccCDH is given as SuccCDH = 
By substituting Pr[S3] = 0 and from Equations 1-6 we have
which is negligible in k. Hence, N gke is a non-information oracle when H is modeled as a random oracle and if CDH is computationally hard in G.
Claim 2. The protocol π gke in Figure 3 securely realizes F + GKE for the non-information oracle N gke assuming that the signature used in the protocol is existentially unforgeable against chosen message attacks (EU-CMA).
Proof. (Sketch) Let A be a real adversary interacting with π gke and real-world parties. We construct an ideal adversary S such that no environment Z can tell whether it is interacting with A and parties running π gke in the real world or with S and dummy parties communicating with F + GKE . The general proof idea is similar to the approach of the two-party cases [15, 23] , but as stated earlier we make use of multiple copies of N gke . These copies of N gke provide S, transcripts of the protocol for its simulation. If all the parties in pid remain uncorrupted, S uses these transcripts to simulate messages among the parties. If only a proper subset of parties in pid is corrupted S obtains the internal state of the copies of N gke through F + GKE that is consistent with the transcripts. Moreover, S can now have the chance to perform the group key exchange on behalf of the corrupted parties with the copies of N gke that correspond to the uncorrupted parties. In both the cases, during its interaction with Z, S supplies transcripts on demand to Z, which are consistent with the final output (that contains the common key) of the uncorrupted parties in the ideal model as observed by Z. S proceeds as follows:
1. S internally keeps a simulation of the parties U n and gives the resulting public keys to A. It also chooses the common parameters: the description of a group G of prime order q and a generator g of G.
3. Upon receiving a message (sid, pid, Ui) from F + GKE for an uncorrupted party Ui, S initiates the simulation of π gke for A, being run by U 6. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , |pid (s) |} do: has not yet sent a message (M
When
already erased its internal state, S has to give the common key to A.
i. If no uncorrupted party in the simulation generated an output, S obtains the local output of N i by corrupting Ui in the ideal model. The key is handed over to A. ii. If some uncorrupted has generated an output, S corrupts Ui, asks F + GKE to deliver the session key to Ui and gives the key to A.
(d) If S has already sent a (deliver, Ui) message to F + GKE , A gets no internal state.
If a simulated party U (s)
i , whose ideal counterpart Ui is uncorrupted, produces an output sk i. If S has not yet sent (ok) to F + GKE , then S first sends (sid,pid,new-session) to F + GKE on behalf of the parties in C who have not done so. If S does not receive (sid,pid,ready) after doing so, it aborts. Otherwise, it sends (ok) back to F + GKE , followed by (deliver, Ui). ii. S aborts if two simulated parties corresponding to uncorrupted ideal parties output different keys. iii. If S already sent (ok) message to F + GKE , S now sends (deliver, Ui).
With the above description of S, we now argue that no PPT environment Z can distinguish its interaction with S in the ideal world from that with A in the real world. We explain only the case where S aborts in its simulation.
• In Step 4, S simulates Round 1 messages on behalf of the uncorrupted parties using the messages obtained from the respective copies of N gke . Note that S aborts the simulation in the case of a simulated party corresponding to an uncorrupted ideal party tries to send a message containing invalid signature. However, this probability is negligible as an uncorrupted simulated party follows the protocol and generates a valid signature using the specified signature scheme.
• In Step 5, S validates the received Round 1 messages and simulates Round 2 messages on behalf of the uncorrupted parties. It aborts simulation if any message received by a simulated party corresponding to an uncorrupted party has invalid signature. However, in this case the real world execution of the protocol would also abort. The adversary A has to forge the signature in case it wants S to accept a signature on a modified message. However, as the signature used is EU-CMA secure this probability negligible. The Round 2 messages simulated by S on behalf of the uncorrupted parties in this step do not introduce any difference. The simulation in
Step 6 is also valid based on the above arguments.
• Corruptions of parties at different stages of the protocol execution are handled in Step 7, without introducing any difference from the point of view of Z. Note, in particular, that the internal state provided in Step 7(b) ii is consistent with the earlier simulated messages.
• The probability of S aborting in Step 8(a)i is negligible. S starts simulating the protocol π gke for a simulated party U (corresponding to an uncorrupted Ui) only after receiving the message (sid, pid, Ui) from F + GKE as described in Step 3. F + GKE sends the (sid, pid, ready) message once it receives the (sid, pid, newsession) message from all Ui ∈ pid. As all the parties in pid are uncorrupted, a party U (s) i outputting a key in the simulation before S receiving the (sid, pid, ready) message is negligible.
• In Steps 8(a)i, 8(a) ii when all the parties in pid are uncorrupted, the common key output (chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1} k ) by these parties remain indistinguishable from a random string. When a proper subset of parties in pid is corrupted, as explained earlier, the output key of the uncorrupted parties is consistent with the earlier simulated messages and this key is an output of one of the copies of N gke .
• S aborts in Step 8(b)ii if two simulated parties corresponding to two uncorrupted parties in the ideal world output two different keys, which happens with negligible probability as the protocol is correct.
If a GKE protocol employs signatures, it is generally assumed that a strong corrupt query or a session state reveal query do not reveal the randomness used in generating the signatures, as this may potentially leak the long-term secret key itself [8, 10] . This is easily simulated by S by revealing internal state of the copies of N gke on an appropriate query from the environment. Note that the copies of N gke do not compute any signatures. Hence, the environment cannot distinguish its interaction with the protocol in the real world and a real adversary from an interaction with S and F + GKE running the copies of N gke in the ideal world. This completes our sketch of proof that the simulation by S is valid.
Discussion
Desmedt et al. [19] propose a notion of shielded insider privacy, which guarantees that the session key distribution is not biased. As explained in Section 3.1, this level of contributiveness can be achieved only assuming weak corruptions and honest majority of participants. On the other hand, if there exists no honest majority of participants, our formulation allows the session key distribution to be biased. As explained by Bresson and Manulis [10] , this scenario cannot be addressed when assuming strong corruptions and corrupted parties up to (|pid| − 1). Hence there is trade-off between the capability of the adversary and the attack it can mount.
In independent work, Furukawa et al. [21] present an ideal functionality for GKE protocols without assuming the availability of unique session IDs. However, they do not consider contributiveness. They also propose a two-round protocol that can realize their functionality. The Initialization phase of our functionality can also be modified in the same way and the protocol in Figure 3 can be shown to realize the resulting functionality with authi as the session ID. Although the protocol of Furukawa et al. [21] is proven secure in the standard model, its security relies on a new non-standard assumption called linear oracle bilinear DiffieHellman assumption. On the other hand, our protocol is proven secure in the random oracle model assuming the hardness of the standard computational Diffie-Hellman problem. It is arguable whether proofs in the standard model assuming a strong computational assumption are of more practical importance than proofs in the random oracle model assuming a weak computational assumption [30] .
We have assumed the hash function H used in the protocol to be a random oracle, while proving that N gke is a non-information oracle but not as a helper functionality in the simulation [22, 1] . This allowed the proof to be simple and yet demonstrating the usefulness of the functionality F + GKE . We leave open the task of constructing efficient protocols which can realize F + GKE without the random oracle assumption.
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APPENDIX A. A REVIEW OF GAME-BASED NOTIONS OF SECURITY FOR GKE
We first review the communication and adversarial model based on Katz and Shin [24] . We try to be as brief as possible due to lack of space.
Let U = {U1, . . . , Un} be a fixed set of n parties. The protocol may be run among any subset of these parties. Each party has a pair of long-term public and private keys, (P KU , SKU ) generated during an initialization phase prior to the protocol run. A group key exchange protocol π is modeled as a collection of n programs running at the n different parties in U. Each instance of π within a party is defined as a session and each party may have multiple such sessions running concurrently. Let π i U be the i-th invocation of the protocol π at party U .
Following [24] , we assume that a unique session ID for each instance of the protocol is provided by a higher-level protocol. The session ID of an instance π The communications network is controlled by an adversary A, which schedules and mediates all sessions among the parties. If the adversary honestly forwards all messages between instances of parties in a given set pid, and each such instance holds the same value sid, then these instances all accept and output identical session keys. Such a protocol is called a correct GKE protocol. In addition to controlling the message transmission, A is allowed to ask the following queries.
• Execute(sid,pid) prompts a complete execution of the protocol among the parties in pid using the unique session ID sid. A is given all the protocol messages, modeling passive attacks.
• Send(π • Corrupt(U) The complete internal state of U including the long-term secret key SKU of U is returned to A. Note that this query does not return the session key, if computed.
• Test(π i U ) A random bit b is secretly chosen. If b = 1, A is given sk i U established at π i U . Otherwise, a random string chosen from the session key probability distribution is given. Note that a Test query is allowed only on an accepted instance.
A.1 AKE Security
We present here the AKE-security notion in the strong corruption model, defined by Katz and Shin [24] . Unlike Bresson and Manulis [10] , we do not separate strong corruption into long-term secret Key reveal and session state reveal queries.
The notion of freshness is central to defining AKE-security for GKE protocols. An instance π i U is unfresh if the instance π i U or any of its partners is asked a RevealKey after having accepted or a Corrupt(U ) query is asked for some U ∈ pid i U before π i U and its partners have terminated. In all other cases π i U is assumed to be fresh. Definition 2. An adversary A ake against the AKE-security notion is allowed to make Execute, Send, RevealKey and Corrupt queries in Stage 1. A ake makes a Test query to an instance π i U at the end of Stage 1 and it is given a challenge key K b as described above. It can continue asking queries in Stage 2. Finally, A ake outputs a bit b and wins the AKE security game if (1) b = b and (2) the instance π i U that was asked Test remains fresh till the end of A ake 's execution. Let SuccA ake be the success probability of A ake in winning the AKE security game. The advantage of A ake in winning this game is AdvA ake = 2 · | Pr[SuccA ake ] − 
A.2 Mutual Authentication
The notion of mutual authentication presented here is a modified version of the one by Bresson and Manulis [10] , as we do not consider session state reveal separately. 
A.3 Contributiveness
The notion of contributiveness presented here can be seen as a strengthened notion of contributiveness defined by Bohli et al. [5] , by considering strong and adaptive corruptions. As stated earlier, this notion does not consider opening attacks.
Definition 4. An adversary Acon against the contributiveness of correct GKE protocol π is allowed ask Execute, Send, RevealKey and Corrupt queries and It operates in two stages prepare and attack:
prepare. Acon queries the instances of π and outputs some state information ζ along with a description of a boolean valued algorithm χ. We denote by Kχ a set of keys Kχ = {k|k ∈ {0, 1} k and χ(k) = true} such that |Kχ| 2 k is negligible in the security parameter k.
